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Recent	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠextending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcaseworkers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ PES	 ﾠ performance.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ accepts	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ
insight	 ﾠbut	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠother	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠagents’	 ﾠdiscretion.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠ‘matchmakers.’	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ(search)	 ﾠ
effort	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contacting	 ﾠ employers	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ collecting	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ verifiable	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ
authority,	 ﾠa	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠcan	 ﾠarise.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐powered	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
job	 ﾠ centers,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ propose	 ﾠ output-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠ schemes	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ assign	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
agencies	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠstrike	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
JEL	 ﾠclassification:	 ﾠJ64,	 ﾠD82	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Frictions	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠeven	 ﾠregular	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjob	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠjob	 ﾠseekers	 ﾠis	 ﾠneither	 ﾠcostless	 ﾠnor	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
inconsiderable	 ﾠ amount	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ successful	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ matches	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ market.	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠgathering	 ﾠto	 ﾠjob	 ﾠseekers	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinefficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠextent	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠgood	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
frictions	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠin	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠup	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
services.	 ﾠAgencies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠjob	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠservices	 ﾠmay	 ﾠon	 ﾠsearch-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠmatchmakers,	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
vacancies.1	 ﾠSearch	 ﾠ theory	 ﾠ predicts	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ
seekers	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠsearch.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contacts	 ﾠmade,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrike	 ﾠrate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠduration	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠMortensen,	 ﾠ1986).	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ
force	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ centers	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ raise	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contact	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ strike	 ﾠ rate.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ Germany,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ agency	 ﾠ (Bundesagentur	 ﾠfür	 ﾠArbeit)	 ﾠ initiated	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ pilot	 ﾠ
project	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcaseload	 ﾠ(viz.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠjob	 ﾠagents	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
unemployed	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ seekers)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ fourteen	 ﾠ designated	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ centers	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ country.	 ﾠ
Hainmueller	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠinvestigated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdemonstration	 ﾠ
project,	 ﾠ reporting	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ selected	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ centers	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice,	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠand	 ﾠcurbing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠclients.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠvein,	 ﾠSchiel	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ extension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ centers	 ﾠ improved	 ﾠ performance	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
indexed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠprospects	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠseekers.	 ﾠOther	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscern	 ﾠimprovements	 ﾠin	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠExamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠare	 ﾠFroelich	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSwitzerland	 ﾠand	 ﾠHill	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠdivide,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠapropos	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcaseload	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠoptimally	 ﾠassign	 ﾠits	 ﾠagents	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠinquiry.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠa	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠconstraints,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcaseload	 ﾠof	 ﾠagents	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ
centers	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbasically	 ﾠbe	 ﾠset	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠPES	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
1	 ﾠWe	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatchmaker	 ﾠacting	 ﾠin	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ  ִ שׁ םיִכוּדּי 	 ﾠ(shidduch)	 ﾠor	 ﾠyenta	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Jewish	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠarranging	 ﾠmarriages	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠfamilies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠ
equals	 ﾠits	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsetting,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠservice	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠis	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
influenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠagents’	 ﾠdiscretion.	 ﾠLocal	 ﾠagents	 ﾠentrusted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgathering	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ
vacancies	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠby	 ﾠdoing.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠnoisy	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter’s	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠand	 ﾠcaseload,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠmay	 ﾠarise	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ centers.2	 ﾠHasenfeld	 ﾠ (1983)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ Lipsky	 ﾠ
(1980)	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ detect	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interactions	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ client	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ agent.	 ﾠ Furthermore,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ contend	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ vague	 ﾠ beliefs	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ real	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Although	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠambitious	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠ
meta-ﾭ‐analysis	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠworks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠeconomic/institutional	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠ	 ﾠsee	 ﾠKluve,	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
Concerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠagents	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
intermediaries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠ
effort	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ effectively	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ search	 ﾠ intensity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ seekers	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlowest	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠunobservable	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠ
effort	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘random’	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠcompounds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter’s	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
pure	 ﾠ luck.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ disconnect	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ explain	 ﾠ why	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ empirical	 ﾠ literature	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoften	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠ‘mixed’	 ﾠresults.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Basically,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ organizational	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ investigation	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ consists	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ (the	 ﾠ principal)	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ delegates	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ task	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ gathering	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠabout	 ﾠvacancies	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠagents).	 ﾠTo	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
hazard	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
search	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠ
rate)	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeither	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠor	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠMosley	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ (2001)	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ examples	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ agency	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ
centers.	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠof	 ﾠAddison	 ﾠand	 ﾠPortugal	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPortuguese	 ﾠPES	 ﾠ
vis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠother	 ﾠjob	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠmeasures.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠby	 ﾠWielgosz	 ﾠand	 ﾠCarpenter	 ﾠ(1988);	 ﾠJones	 ﾠ
(1988);	 ﾠBlau	 ﾠand	 ﾠRobbins,	 ﾠ(1990);	 ﾠWinter-ﾭ‐Ebmer	 ﾠ(1991);	 ﾠBishop	 ﾠ(1993).	 ﾠMore	 ﾠoptimistic	 ﾠevaluations	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠGregg	 ﾠand	 ﾠWadsworth	 ﾠ (1996);	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠ(1997).	 ﾠAn	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠbut	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠunexploited	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlongevity	 ﾠof	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠjob	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠroutes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmet	 ﾠinducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠon	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ constraint	 ﾠ defining	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ maximum	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ load	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ demanded	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ placement	 ﾠ
officers	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ incentive-ﾭ‐feasible	 ﾠ budgeting	 ﾠ
mechanisms	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ satisfy	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ constraints.	 ﾠ Among	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ incentive-ﾭ‐feasible	 ﾠ
schemes,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠat	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
general,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠ constraint	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ binding	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ unobservable.	 ﾠ
Therefore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠrent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond-ﾭ‐
best	 ﾠoptimum.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Apart	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ informational	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ physical	 ﾠ constraints,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconstraint.	 ﾠTypically,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠnations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principal	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠagents	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompensate	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort.4	 ﾠObviously,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠscope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠincentive-ﾭ‐feasible	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprime	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠa	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcaseloads	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservices	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrather	 ﾠblunt	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠoutsourcing	 ﾠor	 ﾠprivatizing	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcircumvent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaforementioned	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠas	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoutput-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠincentive-ﾭ‐payments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠretain	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhands.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠpurposes;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ audit	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ allocation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ funds	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ security	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Hill,	 ﾠ 2005).	 ﾠ Such	 ﾠ
material	 ﾠ‘by-ﾭ‐products’	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠpublicly-ﾭ‐provided	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfully	 ﾠprivatized.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠrealities,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠA	 ﾠrare	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠWalsh	 ﾠ
(1995),	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ proposes	 ﾠ payments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bankers	 ﾠ contingent	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ curbing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ inflation	 ﾠ rate.	 ﾠ
Examples	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠutilities,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠretain	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(otherwise)	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠcost	 ﾠpricing	 ﾠregimes.	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠreform	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsalary	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ(Tarifvertrag	 ﾠfür	 ﾠ
den	 ﾠöffentlichen	 ﾠDienst,	 ﾠor	 ﾠTVöD)	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ1	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠsalary	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠoutput-ﾭ‐
related	 ﾠcompensation.	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ18	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTVöD	 ﾠallows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture.	 ﾠCurrently,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠfar	 ﾠshort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
providing	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠpowered	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderscored	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠ
payments	 ﾠunder	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ18	 ﾠis	 ﾠtightly	 ﾠlimited.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠSubsidization	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠvoucher	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠwas	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2002	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠintention	 ﾠof	 ﾠending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonopoly	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠagency;	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠ
see	 ﾠWinterhager	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2006).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠreward	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdispenses	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠside	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠassigns	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ repeated	 ﾠ relationship,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principal	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ budgeting	 ﾠ plan	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
predetermines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ
Hence,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ center	 ﾠ undertakes	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ mission	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ capacity.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
prospect	 ﾠof	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠrelax	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠagents	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠclients	 ﾠthat	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠserved.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ effectively	 ﾠ punish	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ centers	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ deliver	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ poor	 ﾠ
outcome	 ﾠby	 ﾠassigning	 ﾠthem	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠstaffing	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠon	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠconstraint.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐off	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
incentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠconstraint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsettings,	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
averse	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfull	 ﾠinsurance.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠunobservable	 ﾠeffort,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠshift	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
meet	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠ constraint.	 ﾠ Such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ budgeting	 ﾠ scheme	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
implemented	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠreceives	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlucky	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ
Otherwise,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmet.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠ
constraint	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠ
contracts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠa	 ﾠresidual	 ﾠclaimant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠ
(unemployment	 ﾠ rate)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ incentivize	 ﾠ search	 ﾠ effort.	 ﾠ On	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ hand,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ
especial	 ﾠcare	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagents	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoverloaded	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠwe	 ﾠenvisage	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠalready	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠexample	 ﾠis	 ﾠhome	 ﾠgrown.	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofessor	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠwho	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠScience	 ﾠ
Foundation.	 ﾠ Exerting	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ increases	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ output	 ﾠ today	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ enhances	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
likelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠVulgo:	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNSF	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ
offers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprospect	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠtomorrow.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice.	 ﾠ Closest	 ﾠin	 ﾠspirit	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠis	 ﾠSheldon’s	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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(2003)	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSwiss	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
parametric	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠfunction.	 ﾠRelatedly,	 ﾠPetrongolo	 ﾠand	 ﾠPissarides	 ﾠ(2001)	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
micro-ﾭ‐foundations,	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠissues	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
matching	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ search-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠ context.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ functional	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
matching	 ﾠ technology	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ assumed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ line	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
foundations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠcontributions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠby	 ﾠSheldon	 ﾠ(2003)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
underpin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrather	 ﾠblunt	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcaseloads	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
outcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠschemes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠ
moral	 ﾠ hazard.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ employ	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ principal-ﾭ‐agent	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ repeated	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠand	 ﾠagent,	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠChiappori	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(1994).	 ﾠFurther,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
intimated	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠa	 ﾠpayoff	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠcontaining	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
monetary	 ﾠcompensation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠcost	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
compensation	 ﾠare	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐separable	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠtreatment.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠoutline	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠprincipal-ﾭ‐agent	 ﾠ
relationship,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
job	 ﾠcenter.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠoutline	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠplan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠomniscient	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠwould	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠthen	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reference	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠconcludes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
II.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBasic	 ﾠModel	 ﾠand	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Job	 ﾠmatch	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ easy	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ obtain.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ particular,	 ﾠ search	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ unemployed	 ﾠ workers	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
satisfactory	 ﾠvacancy	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠ search-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠ reasoning,	 ﾠ match	 ﾠ unemployment	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ unemployed	 ﾠ
workers	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ–	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠcrucially	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝗼.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ
indicates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrival	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠworker	 ﾠlearns	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠbetween.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecreasing	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ𝑈 𝗼 .6	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠIn	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsearch-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠsteady	 ﾠstate	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
decreasing	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsteady	 ﾠstate	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
influences	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ determined	 ﾠ outside	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ model;	 ﾠ examples	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ business	 ﾠ
cycle,	 ﾠregion-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠshocks,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠfactors.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstochastic	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝗼	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
model	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠelements.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠ
{𝗼 ,𝗼 },	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ𝗼  − 𝗼  > 0.	 ﾠEquivalently,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠ𝗼 ,	 ﾠyielding	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝑈 𝗼  = 𝑈 ,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“lucky	 ﾠcase”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ𝗼 	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
𝑈 𝗼  = 𝑈 	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“unlucky	 ﾠcase.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Governments	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠnations	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠ
(information	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ jobs)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ unemployment	 ﾠ workers.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ model,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
job	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠjob	 ﾠseeker.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
express	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ devoted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ placement	 ﾠ officer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ individual	 ﾠ client.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ
comprises	 ﾠcounseling	 ﾠsessions,	 ﾠplus	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠdata	 ﾠretrieval	 ﾠand	 ﾠcareer	 ﾠguidance.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ center	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ interpreted	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ vertically	 ﾠ integrated	 ﾠ entity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠused	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
input	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝑈 .	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
stochastic	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“lucky	 ﾠcase”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“unlucky	 ﾠ case,”	 ﾠ conditional	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ𝑠,	 ﾠ namely	 ﾠ
𝑝 𝗼 |𝑠 = 1−𝑝 𝗼 |𝑠 .	 ﾠ Technically	 ﾠ speaking,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ arbitrary	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠin	 ﾠ𝑠 ∈ ℝ .	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframe	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame	 ﾠwith	 ﾠasymmetric	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
reasonable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ assume	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ threshold	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnoticeable	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdetect	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
critical	 ﾠ𝑠 .	 ﾠ Above	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ threshold	 ﾠ𝑠  ﾠhowever	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ
quantify	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ level.	 ﾠ Intrinsically,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ matching	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ improved	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ high-ﾭ‐
volume	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“lucky	 ﾠcase”	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠstochastic	 ﾠdominance.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ𝑝(𝗼 |𝑠)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecreasing	 ﾠand	 ﾠconvex	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
𝑈 𝗼 =
 
   ∙       
 ﾠ,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ𝗿	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠfactor,	 ﾠ𝐹(∙)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcumulative	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wage	 ﾠw	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ𝑤 	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠwage	 ﾠformulated	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaximize	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠjob	 ﾠseekers’)	 ﾠlife-ﾭ‐
time	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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function	 ﾠof	 ﾠs.	 ﾠThen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ𝐸 𝑈 |𝑠 	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcave	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ𝑠	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ center	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
intermediate	 ﾠ product,	 ﾠ whose	 ﾠ inputs	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ𝐿 ﾠand	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ𝑒,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ𝐿 ∈ ℝ 	 ﾠand	 ﾠ𝑒 ∈ ℝ .	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtime	 ﾠconsuming	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠ
input	 ﾠand	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjob	 ﾠvacancies	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
special	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠassigning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclients	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
services,	 ﾠproving	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠcareer	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠHagen	 ﾠand	 ﾠLurie,	 ﾠ1994;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ Rothman,	 ﾠ 1991).	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ special	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ represented	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ search	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ𝑒.	 ﾠ
Familiarly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐behaved	 ﾠ production	 ﾠ technology	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ
depending	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ labor	 ﾠ input	 ﾠ𝐿	 ﾠand	 ﾠ search	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ𝑒	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ written	 ﾠ𝑠 = 𝑠 𝐿,𝑒 ,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
𝑠  𝐿,𝑒 > 0,	 ﾠ𝑠   𝐿,𝑒 < 0,	 ﾠ𝑠   𝐿,𝑒 > 0,	 ﾠ𝑠  𝐿,𝑒 > 0,	 ﾠ𝑠   𝐿,𝑒 < 0.	 ﾠ Further,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠis	 ﾠzero	 ﾠat	 ﾠzero	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠderivative	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠzero	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠor	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠinfinity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ𝐿	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠtis	 ﾠnormalized	 ﾠto	 ﾠunity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠdepict	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ agent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ principal	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ disutility	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ center	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ search	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ𝑒	 ﾠis	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ𝜓(𝑒)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ𝜓′ 𝑒 > 0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
𝜓′′ 𝑒 ≥ 0.	 ﾠ
Dynamic	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠand	 ﾠtiming	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐game	 ﾠ
Consistent	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ search-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠ framework,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principal-ﾭ‐agent	 ﾠ relationship	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠone.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠline	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsearch-ﾭ‐theoretical	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠan	 ﾠinfinite	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
horizon,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠare	 ﾠdenoted	 ﾠby	 ﾠ𝑡,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ𝑡 = 1,2,…,∞ ﾠ	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠ𝗿,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠvalid	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ0 < 𝗿 < 1.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠdevices	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠplan	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ predetermines	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ size	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ agency	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠin	 ﾠ𝑡.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
commitment	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ implement	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ long-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠ contract	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ advance	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
scheme	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠhorizon	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7 See	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠA.1.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
8	 ﾠ
process.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠby	 ﾠ𝐿   
  = 𝐿   (𝑈 
 )	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ
center	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1	 ﾠif	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ𝑈 
 	 ﾠin	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ𝑡	 ﾠis	 ﾠ observed.	 ﾠ Further,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠ𝑒 , ﾠ𝑠 , ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠ𝑈 
  ﾠsignify	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ level,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠ rate,	 ﾠ respectively,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ corresponding	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ𝑡.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
clarity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenerality,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠremains	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠin	 ﾠt.8	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtiming	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame	 ﾠat	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
time	 ﾠ𝑡	 ﾠand	 ﾠt+1,	 ﾠfor ﾠ𝑡 = 1,…,∞	 ﾠ	 ﾠsees	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠsubsequently	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Stage	 ﾠ1.t	 ﾠ First,	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 ﾠ,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠ
𝐿   
  = 𝐿   (𝑈 
 )	 ﾠ	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ𝑖 = 1,2	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Stage	 ﾠ2.t	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ step,	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ t,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ chooses	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠ service	 ﾠs .	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ effected	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ exerting	 ﾠ
search	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ𝑒 ,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
  = 𝐿 (𝑈   
  );	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
Stage	 ﾠ3.t+1	 ﾠ Third,	 ﾠnature	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝗼 	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠon	 ﾠs 	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠperiod ﾠ𝑡.	 ﾠ
Stage	 ﾠ4.t+1	 ﾠ Finally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠ𝐿   
  = 𝐿   (𝑈 
 )	 ﾠ	 ﾠis	 ﾠexecuted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1.	 ﾠ
Due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ limited	 ﾠ commitment	 ﾠ power,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ
contract	 ﾠ𝐿   
  (𝑈   
  )	 ﾠin	 ﾠt+1	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝑈   
  .	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠ
Fundamentally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠassumptions.	 ﾠ
Firstly,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsonant	 ﾠwith	 ﾠactive	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ intends	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
exogenously	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice ﾠ𝑠  = 𝑠 
∗.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtarget,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠassign	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt+1	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchange	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshall	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠmay	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠanticipate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsetting,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠserially	 ﾠcorrelated,	 ﾠ
namely	 ﾠa	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠpast	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
detect	 ﾠserial	 ﾠcorrelation,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠduly	 ﾠrefine	 ﾠits	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriori	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠWe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠan	 ﾠarbitrarily	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ𝑈 
 .	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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t+1.	 ﾠ Secondly,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ assume	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ seeks	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ minimize	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
overall	 ﾠ expected	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ size	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ𝐿 
 	 ﾠ
assigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 − 1 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsunk	 ﾠcost	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠoffice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠomitted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠfunction:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝗿𝐿   
  + 𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝗿𝐿   
  .	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Note	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ neutral	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ stochastic	 ﾠ (per-ﾭ‐period)	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠis	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠ𝑈 .	 ﾠ
Objective	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠdeploys	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠpredetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
office.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠby	 ﾠexerting	 ﾠcostly	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ𝑒 .	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
per-ﾭ‐period	 ﾠutility	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwritten:	 ﾠ
(2)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 𝑉 𝑒  = 𝑧 − 𝜓(𝑒 )	 ﾠ	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ𝑡 = 1,…,∞, ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠ𝑧	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠutility	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠDifferent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ remainder	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ inverse	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
intermediate	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ𝑠  = 𝑠(𝑒 ,𝐿 
 ).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinverse	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠtells	 ﾠus	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
effort	 ﾠ𝑒  ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠmust	 ﾠexert	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠvia	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
 ,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠ𝑒  = 𝑒 𝑠 ,𝐿 
  .	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠ
cost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviewpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter,	 ﾠconfronted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝐿 
 ,	 ﾠis:	 ﾠ
(3)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ𝑀𝐶 𝑠  =
  (  ) ﾠ
  (  
 ,  ). ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ marginal	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ𝑠 ,	 ﾠ denoted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ ﾠ𝑀𝐶 𝑠  	 ﾠ	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
increasing	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ𝑠 .	 ﾠ Further,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ quasi-ﾭ‐concavity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intermediate	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠ𝑠(𝐿 
 ,𝑒 ),	 ﾠcoupled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠceteris	 ﾠparibus	 ﾠassumption,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ𝑀𝐶 𝑠  	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠA.1).	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠhidden	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
maximum	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠset	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 .	 ﾠFormally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠis	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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individual	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠprincipal-ﾭ‐agent	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
assume	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ job-ﾭ‐center	 ﾠ agents	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ inter-ﾭ‐temporally	 ﾠ balance	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐period	 ﾠhorizon.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠworkload	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠunion	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmay	 ﾠelect	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠstrike	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmet	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
staff.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠshow	 ﾠbelow,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠresults	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠchange	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ
load	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠhad	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmet	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠone	 ﾠperiod.10	 ﾠThe	 ﾠagent’s	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠpay-ﾭ‐off	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐period	 ﾠhorizon	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby:	 ﾠ
(4)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝑉 𝑒 𝑠 ,𝐿 
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  .	 ﾠ
Assuming	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ overall	 ﾠ reservation	 ﾠ utility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ placement	 ﾠ officers	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
exogenously	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ reservation	 ﾠ utility	 ﾠ𝐷,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ formulate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ maximum	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ load	 ﾠ
constraint	 ﾠ(WC	 ﾠ)	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
WC  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝑉 𝑒 𝑠 
∗,𝐿 
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  ≥	 ﾠ
1 − 𝗿 𝐷, for ﾠall ﾠ𝑖.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Using	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠ(2),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠequivalently	 ﾠwrite:	 ﾠ
𝜓 𝑒 𝑠 
∗,𝐿 
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
 
≤ ﾠ 1 + 𝗿 𝑧 − 𝐷 ,for ﾠall ﾠ𝑖.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠworkload	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠWC	 ﾠcrucially	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthree	 ﾠvariables:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
current	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
 ;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝐸(𝐿   
  );	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠservices	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠt+1,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠa	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
 	 ﾠand	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice ﾠ𝑠 
∗ ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠplan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpromises	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaffing	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝐸(𝐿   
  ).	 ﾠOtherwise,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter’s	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠutility	 ﾠD	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmet.	 ﾠFurther,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗,	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠmust	 ﾠexert	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠcostly	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ𝑒 	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠagain	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaffing	 ﾠ𝐸(𝐿   
  )	 ﾠas	 ﾠstated	 ﾠin	 ﾠLemma	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
confronted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ𝐿 
 	 ﾠ,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 − 1,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
 ,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 − 1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworkload	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠmet	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠone	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
limited	 ﾠliability	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠprincipal-ﾭ‐agent	 ﾠliterature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠ
Lemma	 ﾠ 1:	 ﾠ The	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1	 ﾠ
crucially	 ﾠ depends	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ𝑡:	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
  	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠopportune	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝐿   
  .	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Proof:	 ﾠsee	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠA.2.	 ﾠ
III.	 ﾠFirst-ﾭ‐Best	 ﾠOptimal	 ﾠBudgeting	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠa	 ﾠbenchmark,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗,	 ﾠit	 ﾠimplements	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleast-ﾭ‐cost	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠand ﾠ𝑒 	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ assigning	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ capacity.	 ﾠ Here	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ assume	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ
punish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcomply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontractual	 ﾠterms	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
targets.11	 ﾠAdditionally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
endeavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠis	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrucially	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠstaffing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ added	 ﾠ complication,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ again	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recognize	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠcompensatory	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
agencies.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservice	 ﾠsalary	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠTVöD)	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠ
limits	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpecuniary	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠfootnote	 ﾠ4).	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
place	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠnations	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreward	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠlower	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠassigns	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminimization	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ𝑡:	 ﾠ
(5)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ min     
  , ﾠ    
  𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝗿𝐿   
  + 𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝗿𝐿   
  	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(WC)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ𝑠  = 𝑠 
∗.	 ﾠ
Lagrange’s	 ﾠ method	 ﾠ yields	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ w.r.t.	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ
𝐿   
  ,𝐿   
  	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“lucky”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“unlucky”	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠrespectively:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(6)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
  ( (    ,    
  ))  (  ,    
  )
  (    ,    
  ) = 𝜆  =
  ( (    ,    
  ))  (  ,    
  )
  (    ,    
  ) .	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠapplications,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠpunish	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfails	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠfulfill	 ﾠits	 ﾠduties.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠeschew	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠ
punishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbenchmark	 ﾠ
solution.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Taking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ(3),	 ﾠand	 ﾠassuming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcorrectly	 ﾠ
anticipate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠoffice,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠrewrite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠorder	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ(6)	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
(7)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMC 𝑠∗ 𝑒   ,𝐿   
  𝑠  𝑒   ,𝐿   
  = 𝜆  = MC 𝑠∗ 𝑒   ,𝐿   
  𝑠  𝑒   ,𝐿   
  .	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ assignment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ center	 ﾠ
contingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠyields	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠcoinsurance	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠagent	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBorch	 ﾠrule.12	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠneutral	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
averse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠwill	 ﾠassign	 ﾠan	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠ
irrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Proposition	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠassigns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
staff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvariant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠoptimization	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠcontracting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
staff	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ assigned	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ period.	 ﾠ Thus,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continuation	 ﾠ
budgeting	 ﾠ plan	 ﾠ consisting	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ sequential	 ﾠ spot	 ﾠ contracts	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ optimal	 ﾠ solution	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
continuation-ﾭ‐contracting	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgame	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐game,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ
Proposition	 ﾠ 2:	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ date	 ﾠ𝑡	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ contract	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ optimal	 ﾠ solution	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continuation-ﾭ‐
contracting	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐game.	 ﾠ
IV.	 ﾠOptimal	 ﾠBudgeting	 ﾠunder	 ﾠMoral	 ﾠHazard	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ𝑒 	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
unobservable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
contract	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠspecifies	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ𝑒 	 ﾠor	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 .	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠwrite	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝑈 
 .	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
contract-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠit	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworthwhile	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗.	 ﾠOtherwise,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
effort	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ unobservable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principal.	 ﾠ Hence,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠexploration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠcoinsurance,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBorch	 ﾠ(1962).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
budgeting	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ meet	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ incentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠ constraint:	 ﾠ
IC  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝑉 𝑒 𝑠 
∗,𝐿 
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  ≥
𝑉 𝑒 𝑠 ,𝐿 
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  + 𝗿𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
   ﾠfor ﾠall ﾠ𝑠  ≥ 𝑠  	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠall	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝑠    > 0.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠincentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠ(IC)	 ﾠtells	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprofitable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
job	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ𝑠∗	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice.13	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠmust	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
𝐿   
  	 ﾠin	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ𝑡 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ𝑖	 ﾠso	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗	 ﾠ
minimizes	 ﾠagents’	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠcosts:	 ﾠ
𝑠 
∗ = argmin 𝜓 𝑒 𝑠 ,𝐿 
  + 𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  + 𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  .	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ𝑠  ≥ 𝑠 .	 ﾠAssuming	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterior	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠorder	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(8)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝑝  𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  − 𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  = 𝑀𝐶 𝑠∗(𝑒 ,𝐿 
 ) ,for ﾠall ﾠs   	 ﾠ
Most	 ﾠimportantly,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠorder	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ(8)	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ lucky	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ unlucky	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ depends	 ﾠ crucially	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distribution	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ𝑖	 ﾠin	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
𝑠    ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ completeness	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ pathological	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
boundary	 ﾠ solution.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠis	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ small,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠunit	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠat	 ﾠ𝑠  = 𝑠 	 ﾠborne	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side	 ﾠof	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ(8).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtend	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ choose	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ boundary	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ𝑠 	 ﾠand	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ
incentivize	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠservice	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
distinguished	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ𝑠 ,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ
supports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterior	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ(8).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ𝑠∗	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt+1	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠ𝑉 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  	 ﾠby	 ﾠ𝑉 𝑒 𝑠∗,𝐿   
  	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
incentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠconstraint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
The	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠsimplicity,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐problem	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠagency’s	 ﾠminimization	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠby	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
moral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ𝑠 
∗	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠ
optimization	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ min     
  ,    
  𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝗿𝐿   
  + 𝑝(𝗼 |𝑠 
∗)𝗿𝐿   
  	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(WC)	 ﾠand	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ(8),	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
𝑝  𝗼  𝑠 
∗ 𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  − 𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  = MC 𝑠∗(𝑒 ,𝐿 
 ) 	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝑠  ≥ 𝑠 
∗.	 ﾠ
Lagrange’s	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠorder	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠw.r.t.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠ𝑖:	 ﾠ
(9)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝑀𝐶 𝑠∗(𝑒   ,𝐿   
  ) 𝑠  = λ  + 𝜇 
  (  |  
∗)
 (  |  
∗),	 ﾠ
(10)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝑀𝐶 𝑠∗(𝑒   ,𝐿   
  ) 𝑠  = λ  − 𝜇 
  (  |  
∗)
   (  |  
∗).	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLagrange	 ﾠmultiplier	 ﾠ𝜇 	 ﾠis	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠzero,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠresult	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
section	 ﾠIII:	 ﾠagents	 ﾠare	 ﾠfully	 ﾠinsured	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunlucky	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimum	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠincentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠis	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ𝜇 	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfully	 ﾠinsured	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠunlucky	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
search	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunlucky	 ﾠcase	 ﾠarises,	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠto	 ﾠunemployed	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
substantial.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠand	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠits	 ﾠwage	 ﾠbill	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
event	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlucky	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠis	 ﾠrewarded	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠa	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
assigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠderive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠoffice’s	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠorder	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠ(9)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(10):	 ﾠ
𝐿   
  𝗼  = 𝜉 (𝗼 )	 ﾠ
𝐿   
  𝗼  = 𝜉  𝗼  ,	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠ𝜉	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinverse	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠorder	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠin	 ﾠ𝗼 .	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ










The	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠline	 ﾠat	 ﾠ𝐿   
   	 ﾠsignifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠby	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
assigns	 ﾠan	 ﾠequal	 ﾠwork	 ﾠforce	 ﾠto	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠlow	 ﾠoutput.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
hazard,	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠare	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠinsured	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠshocks.	 ﾠTherefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecreasing	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠ
(𝐿   
  )	 ﾠif	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ𝑈 
 (𝑈 
 )	 ﾠoccurs.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠslope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠ
crucially	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠderived	 ﾠin	 ﾠlemma	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠslope	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠflat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
conversely.	 ﾠ
Proposition	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
staff	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ assigned	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ center	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠ optimal	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠcase	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠrate	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond-ﾭ‐best	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
scheme	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt	 ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝐿	 ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝐿   
   	 ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ𝑈 
 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝑈 
  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝑈	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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Proof:	 ﾠsee	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠA.4.	 ﾠ
Further,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠderive	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠslope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠsteep.	 ﾠ
Due	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconvexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisutility	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
averse	 ﾠ agent	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ meet	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ load	 ﾠ constraint	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ agent	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ
confronted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery ﾠ 𝐿   
  𝐿   
  .	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠJensen’s	 ﾠinequality,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
11  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  + 𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝐿   
  <	 ﾠ
𝜓 𝑒 𝑠   ,𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝐿   
  +  ﾠ𝑝 𝗼  𝑠  𝐿   
  	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
obtains.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeets	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ budgeting	 ﾠ scheme	 ﾠ offered	 ﾠ shifts	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ agent.	 ﾠ According	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
budgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠdepicted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠbest	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ𝐿   
   	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“lucky	 ﾠcase”	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ best	 ﾠ optimal	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ𝐿   
   	 ﾠand	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠ
offered	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“unlucky	 ﾠcase”	 ﾠunder	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard.14	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
faces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“lucky	 ﾠcase”	 ﾠconsecutively	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccumulate	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠstaff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠprecludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccumulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
longer	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠschemes	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspot,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtailor	 ﾠits	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠcapacity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
Appendix	 ﾠA.5	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaforementioned	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecreasing	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtradeoff	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincentivizing	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
exert	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠand	 ﾠinsuring	 ﾠthem	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠshocks.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprofitable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠∗.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠmay	 ﾠgo	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠless	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠentails	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
prime	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠconstraint.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexogenously	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠservice	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠmany	 ﾠother	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠcost	 ﾠborne	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠ
(consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociological,	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠprovision)	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠpartial	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠabstracts	 ﾠfrom.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
proper	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠassigns	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalter	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
factors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalterations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworkforce	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ





the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠperiod ﾠ𝑡.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLagrange	 ﾠmultiplier	 ﾠ𝜇 	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
assume	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠif	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
 	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow	 ﾠand	 ﾠconversely	 ﾠif	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ𝐿 
 	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠproposition:	 ﾠ
Proposition	 ﾠ 4:	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ (low),	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ optimal	 ﾠ
budgeting	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ entails	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ small	 ﾠ (large)	 ﾠ wedge	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlucky	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unlucky	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ𝐿   
  ,	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠ
Proof:	 ﾠsee	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠA.5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠwork	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠ
caseload)	 ﾠis	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
providing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠ
incentivize	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠagents	 ﾠto	 ﾠexert	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠshift	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠextent	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠ
incentive-ﾭ‐compatibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpremium.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcaseload	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmore-ﾭ‐
high	 ﾠpowered	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠshifted	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠagents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠreal-ﾭ‐world	 ﾠapplications	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ schemes	 ﾠ contingent	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ region-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠ
circumstances.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠuse	 ﾠsome	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ demographic	 ﾠ development	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ region.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
valuable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠHolmström	 ﾠ(1979)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠfilter	 ﾠout	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnoise	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcircumstances.15	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ office	 ﾠ learns	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ region	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ disproportionally	 ﾠ hit	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ cyclical	 ﾠ
downturns16	 ﾠor	 ﾠ buffeted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ exogenous	 ﾠ shock	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ closing	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠStructural	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidiosyncratic	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠregional	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠmay	 ﾠform	 ﾠsome	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠallows	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠ
Basically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ(𝑑𝑝/𝑑𝑠)/𝑝	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠterm	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ(9)	 ﾠ
measures	 ﾠhow	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinfer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠexerts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequested	 ﾠunobservable	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort.	 ﾠStructural	 ﾠdata	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ
(𝑑𝑝/𝑑𝑠)/𝑝	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠby	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠby	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcycle,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠRusso	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠ2001. 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠ
company,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalways	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsituation.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠderive	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠ(9)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(10)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠnature	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠforce	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝐿 	 ﾠ
assigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠregion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthe	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠ
( 𝐿   
  ,𝐿   
  ) 	 ﾠto	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ offered	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ incentive-ﾭ‐
compatibility.17	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
V.	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsought	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠloads	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuttress	 ﾠ
search	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠcombating	 ﾠfrictional	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠunemployment.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ paper,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ dynamic	 ﾠ budgeting	 ﾠ scheme	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ efficient	 ﾠ
allocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠacross	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
discretion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠagents	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠwork	 ﾠload	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠneither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexpend	 ﾠin	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠjob	 ﾠseekers	 ﾠto	 ﾠvacancies	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrate	 ﾠis	 ﾠverifiable	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠservice	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
rooted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ search	 ﾠ theory	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ agency	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ
Using	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
staff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠexposition,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠstylized	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠvalid	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneralized	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmilieu	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠoffice)	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠpay	 ﾠany	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠagents	 ﾠ(local	 ﾠjob	 ﾠ
centers).	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ shown	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principal	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ nonetheless	 ﾠ circumvent	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠby	 ﾠdesigning	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠassigns	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠin	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Further,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
implemented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠsaid,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠagain	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠhere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhold	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠ
pre-ﾭ‐committing	 ﾠstaffing	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountable	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠRecall	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
workload	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠservice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprovided.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
has	 ﾠno	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠpostpone	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassignment	 ﾠof	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
secure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠprime	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠour	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠextended	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
encompass	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠnature	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthis	 ﾠend,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonotonous	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠratio	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfulfilled	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ first-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ stochastic	 ﾠ dominance.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ research,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
interesting	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠa	 ﾠframework	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠboth	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublicly-ﾭ‐provided	 ﾠ






	 ﾠ(A.1)	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ expected	 ﾠ unemployment	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ𝐸 𝑈 |𝑠 = 𝑝(𝗼 |𝑠)(𝑏 ∙ 𝑈  − 𝐿 ) +
𝑝(𝗼 |𝑠)(𝑏 ∙ 𝑈  − 𝐿 ).	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠstochastic	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠis	 ﾠfulfilled	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
𝑝  𝗼  𝑠 < 0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ𝑝   𝗼  𝑠 > 0.	 ﾠThen,	 ﾠ
     | 
   > 0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
     | 
    < 0,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstochastic	 ﾠ
output	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinput	 ﾠs	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠproperties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(A.2)	 ﾠ Due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concavity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intermediate	 ﾠ production	 ﾠ function,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠs∗	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlucky	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt	 ﾠ[i.e.	 ﾠ𝑒(𝑠∗,𝐿 
 )]	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ unlucky	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ t	 ﾠ [i.e.	 ﾠ𝑒(𝑠∗,𝐿 
 )].	 ﾠ Therefore,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
providing ﾠs∗	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunlucky	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠopportune	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1. ﾠ
(A.3)	 ﾠThe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdecides	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ𝑠	 ﾠsee	 ﾠitself	 ﾠconfronted	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠcost	 ﾠminimization	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠminimizes	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ𝜓 𝑒  	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠwork	 ﾠforce.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ℒ 𝑒  = 𝜓 𝑒  − 𝜗 𝑠 𝐿 
 ,𝑒  − 𝑠 ,	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠ𝜗	 ﾠ	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLagrange	 ﾠmultiplier.	 ﾠThen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠorder	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwritten: ﾠ




. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ	 ﾠ
Using	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvelope	 ﾠtheorem,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠderive	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMC 𝑠 ,𝐿 
 ′ 	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠMC 𝑠 ,𝐿 
  ﾠ 	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠ𝐿 
 	 ﾠ
smaller	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ𝐿 
 .	 ﾠ
(A.4)	 ﾠ By	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ stochastic	 ﾠ dominance,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ derive	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ inequality:	 ﾠ





𝑝 (𝗼 |𝑠 
∗)
1 − 𝑝 𝗼  𝑠 
∗ < 0. ﾠ	 ﾠ
Adding	 ﾠup	 ﾠequations	 ﾠ(10)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(11)	 ﾠyields: ﾠ
(12) ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠMC 𝑠∗(𝑒 ,𝐿   
  ) 𝑠  − MC 𝑠∗(𝑒 ,𝐿   
  ) 𝑠  = 𝜇 
  (  |  
∗)
 (  |  
∗) −
  (  |  
∗)
   (  |  
∗)  ﾠ.	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠA.2	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleft-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ(12)	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠif	 ﾠ𝐿   
  exceeds	 ﾠ
𝐿   
  .	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultiplier	 ﾠ𝜇  ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand-ﾭ‐side	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠterm	 ﾠin	 ﾠbrackets	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegative.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
(A.5)	 ﾠLet	 ﾠus	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfinity.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
effort	 ﾠ𝑠 (𝐿 
 ,𝑒 )	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ converge	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ value,	 ﾠ denoted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ𝜌.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ agent’s	 ﾠ
marginal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠthus	 ﾠconverges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠlim → (MC(𝑠)) =
  (  ) ﾠ
  .	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠunit	 ﾠ𝑠	 ﾠborne	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagent	 ﾠapproximates	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠ
low	 ﾠ value,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ multiplier	 ﾠﾵʼ 	 ﾠconverges	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ optimal	 ﾠ
budgeting	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠunder	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠentail	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠwedge	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ𝑡 + 1,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠ𝐿   
  	 ﾠand	 ﾠ𝐿   
  .	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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